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Corporate Governance and Shariah Compliance 
in Institutions Offering Islamic Financial Services 
 
 
The structures and processes established within an Instiution Offering Islamic financial 
Services (IIFS) for monitoring and evaluating Shariah compliance rely essentially on 
arrangements internal to the firm. By being incorporated in the institutional structure, a 
Shariah Supervisory Board (SSB) has the advantage of being close to the market. 
Competent, independent, and empowered to approve new Shariah-conforming 
instruments, an SSB can enable innovation  likely to emerge within the institution. The 
paper reviews the issues and options facing current arrangements for ensuring Shariah 
compliance by IIFS. It suggests a framework that draws on internal and external 
arrangements to the firm and emphasizes market discipline. In issuing its fatwas, an SSB 
could be guided by standardized contracts and practices that could be harmonized by  a 
self-regulatory professionals’ association. A framework with the suggested internal and 
external features could ensure adequate consistency of interpretation and enhance the 
enforceability of contracts before civil courts. The review of transactions would mainly 
be entrusted to internal review units, which would collaborate with external auditors 
responsible for issuing an annual opinion on whether the institution’s activities met its 
Shariah requirements. This process would be sustained by reputable entities such as 
rating agencies, stock markets, financial media, and researchers who would channel 
signals to market players. This framework would enhance public understanding of the 
requirements of Shariah and lead to a more effective utilization of options available to 
stakeholders to achieve continuing improvements in Islamic financial services.  
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I.  Introduction: Corporate Governance and Shariah Compliance
1  
 
       Islamic finance helped sustain economic growth throughout the Muslim world 
during the Middle Ages. The last three decades witnessed its revival, notably following 
the first oil price shock of 1973-74. Beyond the surge in liquidity, its reemergence was 
prompted by the introduction of innovative Islamic financial products and a demand by 
Muslim populations for financial services compatible with their religious beliefs. More 
recently, the industry has received a new impetus. It can be ascribed to an uncertain 
performance of western financial markets, a perception of increased risk for Gulf 
Cooperation Council capital in traditional financial markets, a renewed surge in oil 
prices, an expressed demand from Muslim communities in Western countries, and the 
development of managerial skills specific to Islamic financial services.
2  As a result, the 
global Islamic financial services industry now includes 284 institutions offering Islamic 
financial services (IIFS) operating in 38 countries, both Muslim and non-Muslim.
3 
Islamic capital markets, mutual funds and insurance services are also developing. 
 
The Governor of the Bahrain Monetary Agency conveyed the sense of the roots of the 
IIFS when he stated that “Islamic banks have grown primarily by providing services to a 
captive market, to people who will only deal with a financial institution that strictly 
adheres to Islamic principles”.
4 Conducting activities in accordance with Shariah entails 
that the institution pledges: i) not to engage in interest-based debt transactions, ii) not to 
                                                 
1 The authors would like to thank Arun Adarkar, Stijn Claessens, Dahlia El-Hawary, Zamir Iqbal, Luigi 
Passamonti, Leila Triki, and participants to meetings of the Islamic Financial Services Board and the 
Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Services for helpful comments on the issues 
discussed.  All remaining errors are the authors’. 
2 According to the General Council of Islamic Banks and Financial Institutions (CIBAFI), total assets have 
roughly doubled in the period 1998-2001, soaring from $134 to 261 Billion. Source: 
http://www.islamicfi.com (last visited April 04, 2005). The figures were reported in a press release by 
CIBAFI dated May 8, 2005, (“CIBAFI Raises the Glance toward IFSI Growth with a Unique Statistic-
Based 10-Year Strategic Plan”).   
3 The term IIFS refers to Islamic financial businesses and includes finance houses, that offer retail 
commercial and investment services. The paper does not deal with Takaful (insurance) companies.  
4 As reported by Middle-East-Online.com on February 17, 2004.  http://www.middle-east-
online.com/english/bahrain/?id=8922=8922&format=0 (last visited April 11, 2005).  
conduct pure financial transactions disconnected from real economic activity, iii) not to 
participate in transactions where there is exploitation of any party, and iv) not to 
participate in activities regarded as harmful to society.
5  
 
.     Initially, IIFS developed without a clear view on the legislative and regulatory 
framework that would apply to them.
6 However, their conceptual foundations and 
operational practices derived from the principles outlined above have specific features 
that pose challenges to regulators and call for solutions beyond the simple extension of 
existing legislation and regulation applying to institutions offering conventional financial 
services (ICFS). To that effect, a number of countries have put in place laws and 
regulations for IIFS, and international bodies have been established to adapt standards 
applying to conventional financial services and promote harmonization of practices.
7  
 
       Enhancing  stakeholders’  value  is a central purpose for any business including 
financial services, whether conventional or Islamic. Their stability, financial 
performances and ability to intermediate resources will depend on stakeholders’ 
confidence in individual institutions and the industry. A particular confidence feature in 
respect of Islamic financial services is the requirement of conveying to stakeholders that 
their financial business is conducted in conformity with their religious beliefs. Corporate 
governance arrangements, internal and external to the corporate entity include structures 
and procedures that should provide sufficient comfort the business is conducted in 
accordance with stated objectives, in particular compliance with Shariah.
8    
                                                 
5 Shariah is Islamic Law extracted from the Qur’an and Sunna (sayings and deeds of the Prophet). Not to 
conduct financial transactions disconnected from real economic activity is sometimes referred to as 
“materiality”. A glossary of Arabic terms is provided in Annex I. 
6 For example, in some cases the general prudential regime was extended to IIFS without recognizing any 
specific feature.  In other cases, IIFS registered as non-bank commercial businesses. For an introduction to 
the principles and instruments of Islamic finance as well as regulatory arrangements applying to IIFS, refer 
to El-Hawary, Grais, and Iqbal (2004). 
7 These include the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), the Accounting and Auditing Organization for 
Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI), the International Islamic Rating Agency (IIRA), the International 
Islamic Financial Market (IIFM) and the Liquidity Management Center (LMC). Rather than seeking to 
replace existing regulation, these bodies propose solutions whenever conventional regulation fails to 
address the distinctiveness of the Islamic financial industry. 
8 This paper deals with CG arrangements that address issues of Shariah compliance. Grais and Pellegrini 
(2006a) provides an overview of the issues and challenges of CG for IIFS. Grais and Pellegrini (2006b) 
deals with IIFS’ CG that address stakeholders’ financial interests.   
 
       A widely adopted approach is to have independent bodies certify Shariah compliance 
by the IIFS. The reliance on independent bodies reflects the currently limited role that 
market discipline can play in ensuring such compliance. Hirschman contended that 
stakeholders generally have two ways of reacting to performance deterioration in 
business organizations.
9  The first is for the stakeholder to quit the organization. The 
other is for the stakeholder to agitate and exert influence for change from within the 
organization.  The potential role that these two mechanisms can play in upholding 
conformity with Shariah is constrained by the perceived complexity of Islamic financial 
instruments and their limited “commoditization”. The diversity of jurisprudence on 
permissible transactions, and the limited disclosure of relevant and reliable financial 
information compound the difficulty.  In addition, market participants and other 
stakeholders are likely to lack sufficient knowledge of Shariah or of financial principles, 
or of both, to judge the transactions of IIFS. In line with the foregoing, compliance with 
Shariah is primarily ensured through organs internal to the IIFS. At the same time, a 
broader enabling institutional environment, sometime referred to as external corporate 
governance is being put in place.  
 
      In the following the paper reviews in section two, prevailing internal arrangements 
that deal with Shariah compliance in individual IIFS; it examines the CG issues involved, 
and proposes measures to strengthen their effectiveness. Section three considers external 
arrangements that complement the ones adopted by individual institutions to promote 
compliance with the Shariah. The concluding section summarizes the overall strengths 
and weaknesses of existing arrangements.   
 
 
II.  Internal CG Arrangements for Shariah Compliance 
 
  The approach most widely adopted currently is to establish independent bodies of 
knowledgeable agents. These bodies are usually internal to the institution and part of its 
                                                 
9 Hirschman, A.O. (1970)  
governance structure. They include Shariah Supervisory Boards and Shariah review 
units. The following first analyzes existing arrangements and then considers options to 
strengthen them. 
 
A. Internal  Arrangements 
 
  Each institution offering Islamic financial services has in-house religious advisers, 
who are collectively known as the Shariah Supervisory Board (SSB).
10 In principle, the 
role of the SSB covers five main areas: certifying permissible financial instruments 
through fatwas (ex-ante Shariah audit), verifying that transactions comply with issued 
fatwas (ex-post Shariah audit), calculating and paying Zakat, disposing of non-Shariah 
compliant earnings, and advising on the distribution of income or expenses among 
shareholders and investment account holders.
11 The SSB issues a report to certify that all 
financial transactions comply with the above-mentioned principles. This report is often an 
integral part of the Annual Report of the Islamic financial institution.  
 
  In practice an SSB’s tasks may vary according to provisions stipulated in the 
articles of association of the financial institution or those stipulated by national 
regulators. A review of 13 IIFS shows that all SSBs were entrusted with ex-ante 
monitoring and the calculation of Zakat.
12 However, ex-post monitoring was within the 
exclusive competence of Shariah review units in at least two cases.
13  In another case, the 
                                                 
10 They exist in all Islamic countries with the exception of Iran, where compliance of the whole banking 
system with Shariah is guaranteed and monitored by the central bank. 
11 A Fatwa is a religious edict or proclamation. It is a legal opinion issued by a qualified Muslim scholar on 
matters of religious belief and practice. The social nature of Islamic finance emerges most clearly in the 
practices of Zakat and Qard Hassan.  Zakat is a tax on wealth, while Qard Hasan refers to zero-return 
beneficence loans made to the needy. The objective, according to the Meezan Bank of Pakistan is the 
“implementation of an equitable economic system, providing a strong foundation for establishing a fair and 
just society for mankind”.See also Briston and El-Ashker (1986) and Abdel Karim (1990). 
12 The sample reflects the accessibility of relevant information in these IIFS.  Source: annual reports, 
articles of association, and all information posted on the websites of the following BIFSs: Bahrain Islamic 
Bank, Al Rajhi Banking Corporation, Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad, Jordan Islamic Bank, Kuwait Finance 
House, Bank Muamalat Malaysia, Shamil Bank, Bahrain, Islamic Bank of Britain, Emirates Islamic Bank, 
Dubai Islamic Bank, Islamic Bank Bangladesh Limited, First Islamic Investment Bank and Bank Rakyat 
Malaysia. Iranian IIFSs were not considered. 
13 This is the case of Al Rajhi Banking Corporation of Saudi Arabia and Dubai Islamic Bank. Such 
decisions may reflect the difficulties that SSBs may encounter in assessing volumes of transactions in large 
IIFS.  
SSB could issue recommendations on how the institution could best fulfill its social role 
as well as promote Islamic finance.
14 In addition to internal corporate arrangements, 
national regulators and international standard setters implement guidelines for SSBs. 
These often refer to SSBs’ general duty to ensure Shariah compliance of transactions 
and, less frequently, indicate areas of competence, composition and decision-making. 
Table I provides an overview of practices in selected countries that have introduced 
guidelines or legislative references on the functioning of SSBs.
15 
 
Table I - Regulations on Internal Shariah Advisory** 










SSB Fit and 
Proper 
Criteria 
Bahrain   3  3  unspecified  3  3 
DIFC*  3  3  unspecified  3  3 
Indonesia  3  unspecified unspecified  3  3 
Jordan  3  3  3  3  unspecified 
Kuwait  3  3  3  unspecified unspecified 
Lebanon  3  3  unspecified  3  unspecified 
Malaysia  3  unspecified unspecified  unspecified  3 
Pakistan  3  3  unspecified  3  3 
Philippines  3  3  unspecified unspecified  3 
Thailand  3  3  unspecified  3  3 
U.A.E.  3  3  unspecified  3  unspecified 
∗   Dubai International Financial Centre 
** See Annex I for details of the legal bases and the provisions of these regulations 
Source: Official Government websites and Central banks’ Annual Reports. 
 
  The functioning of SSBs raises five main issues of corporate governance: 
independence, confidentiality, competence, consistency, and disclosure.  The first 
                                                 
14 The 2002 Annual SSB report of Islamic Bank Bangladesh Ltd contains suggestions on investment 
strategies, such as housing schemes, to help the poor and on research policy, such as the publication and 
translation of Islamic banking books. (www.islamibankbd.com, last visited April 18, 2005). 
15 Only those countries are included where authorities have implemented laws, acts or issued circulars and 
regulations on internal Shariah Supervisory Boards. Annex I details the legal bases and the provisions of 
these regulations.  
concerns the independence of the SSB from management. Generally members of the SSB 
are appointed by the shareholders of the bank, represented by the Board of Directors. As 
such, they are employed by the financial institution, and report to the Board of Directors. 
Their remuneration is proposed by the management and approved by the Board. The SSB 
members’ dual relationship with the institution as providers of remunerated services and 
as assessors of the nature of operations could be seen as creating a possible conflict of 
interest.  
 
  In principle, SSB members are required to submit an unbiased opinion in all 
matters pertaining to their assignment.  However, their employment status generates an 
economic stake in the financial institution, which can negatively impact their 
independence. The opinions of the SSB may, for example, prohibit the bank engaging in 
certain profitable transactions or impose a reallocation of illicit income to charity, 
resulting in a poorer overall financial performance. Under these circumstances, the bank 
managers may be tempted to use their leverage to influence SSB members, producing  
what is commonly referred to as “Fatwa shopping” or “Shariah advisory à la carte”.  
 
  In practice, the risk of such conflict of interest is mitigated by the ethical 
standards of the SSB members, and the high cost that a stained reputation would inflict 
on them and on the financial institution. Generally, members of SSBs are highly regarded 
Shariah scholars and guardians of its principles. Therefore, a less than truthful 
assessment and disclosure of Shariah compliance by an SSB would seem to be highly 
unlikely. In the event that it does occur and comes to light, it would seriously damage the 
concerned scholars’ reputation and the prospect for further recourse to their services. 
Similarly, managerial interference in compliance assessments can lead to a loss of 
shareholders’ and stakeholders’ confidence. Management may be penalized and face 
dismissal. All that being said, and the heavy costs of untruthful assessments 
notwithstanding, a potential conflict of interest is inherent in existing corporate 
arrangements regarding SSBs.  
  
  The issue of confidentiality is intertwined with that of independence.  Often, some 
Shariah scholars sit on the SSBs of more than one financial institution. This association 
with multiple IIFS may be seen as a strength in as much as it could enhance an SSB’s 
independence vis-à-vis a particular institution. However, it does give the particular 
individual access to proprietary information of other,  possibly competing institutions. 
Thus SSB members may find themselves in another type of potential conflict of interest. 
In the current practice, Malaysia has attempted to deal with this issue by discouraging 
jurists from sitting on the SSB of more than one IIFS. While this eliminates 
confidentiality concerns, the practice poses other potential problems. First, it would 
exacerbate lack of competence where there is a scarcity of Fiqh al-Muamalat jurists.
16 
Second, it may prevent the formation of an efficient labor market for Shariah audit, by 
decreasing the economic appeal of the profession. Lastly, it may create a symbiotic 
relationship between the auditor and the financial institution that could undermine 
impartiality. 
 
  The third issue relates to the nature of the competence required of SSB members.  
Due to the unique role that they are called upon to fulfill, SSB members should ideally be 
knowledgeable in both Islamic law and commercial and accounting practices (Fiqh al-
Muamalat). In practice, it would appear that very few scholars are well-versed in both 
disciplines. The issue has been addressed by including members from different 
backgrounds in most SSBs.
17 However, the combination of experts rather than expertise 
creates the challenge of overcoming different perspectives as well as the risk of potential 
failure of communication. Over time, the demand gap for combined Shariah and financial 
skills is likely to be reduced through public policy and normal labor market operations. 
Progress in this direction is already noticeable in countries where the Islamic financial 
industry is well established. For instance, the Securities Commission of Malaysia has 
certified a total of 27 individuals and 3 companies eligible for Shariah advisory on unit 
                                                 
16 Fiqh al-Muamalat literally translates into Islamic Commercial Jurisprudence 
17 AAOIFI (Governance Standard 1) recommends to include jurists of Fiqh Al-Muamalat.   
trust funds, for a total of 24 companies offering such funds.
18 However, in countries 
where Islamic finance is less developed, other transitional arrangements may be needed.  
 
  The fourth issue concerns consistency of judgment across banks, over time, or 
across jurisdictions within the same bank.  In essence the activities of SSBs are in the 
nature of creating jurisprudence by the interpretation of legal sources. It should therefore 
not be surprising to find conflicting opinions on the admissibility of specific financial 
instruments or transactions.
19 In reality, however, the diversity of opinions is less 
widespread than might be expected. The CIBAFI sampled about 6000 fatwas, and found 
that 90% were consistent across banks. The fact that over one hundred Shariah scholars 
around the world issued these fatwas would suggest an overall consistency in the 
interpretation of the sources.
20 Further, this high degree of consistency between the 
fatwas would also point to a substantial independence of SSBs. Nevertheless, as the 
industry expands, the number of conflicting fatwas on the permissibility of an instrument 
is likely to increase. This could undermine customer confidence in the industry and have 
repercussions on the enforceability of contracts.
21  
 
  The last and overarching issue relates to disclosure of all information relating to 
Shariah advisories. In addition to the positive aspects of thus empowering stakeholders, 
disclosure could be the means to addressing some of the issues discussed in the preceding 
paragraphs. A transparent financial institution would ideally disclose the duties, decision-
making process, areas of competence, and the composition of its SSB, as well publish all 
fatwas issued by the SSB. This would strengthen stakeholders’ confidence in the 
credibility of SSB assessments. In addition, public disclosure of such information would 
                                                 
18The proportion of advisors to company seems to be quite large. Every management company must 
appoint at least 3 Shariah advisors for one company. This means that every advisor would serve on the 
SSBs of about two or more fund management companies. Data on Shariah advisors and approved 
instruments are available at http://www.sc.com.my (as of March 14, 2005). 
19 A typical example is the financing of leisure activities, which is frowned upon as haram by some Fiqh 
scholars. Moreover, Islamic jurisprudence is based on different schools of thought that may vary from 
country to country (the Shiah branch and the Sunni branch, which in turn includes the Madhahib, Shafie, 
Hanafi, Hanbali and Maliki traditions). 
20 As quoted in the proceedings of the Fourth Harvard University Forum on Islamic Finance, available at   
http://www.hifip.harvard.edu/MoreInfo.asp?news_id=34 (last visited March 14, 2005) 
21 It may be hard to invalidate contracts on grounds of a breach of Shariah law, if Shariah has no legal 
force in the country and there are no widely acceptable codified standards or contract specimens.  
provide a forum for educating the public, thus paving the way for a larger role for market 
discipline in regard to Shariah compliance. Finally, it would decrease the costs that 
external agents may face in assessing the quality of internal Shariah supervision. 
 
  Despite all these potential benefits, transparency does not currently seem to be 
widely prevalent.  Out of 13 banks reviewed, all declared the existence of an SSB within 
the organization and disclosed information on its composition.
22 However, only 7 made 
the annual report of the SSB easily accessible, and 7 did not provide detailed information 
on the professional background of SSB members.
23 Moreover, only two banks disclosed 
the  fatwas authorizing the provision of financial services and products. Only one 
disclosed provisions for decision-making and interaction with other bodies of the firm. 
Finally, only one institution disclosed on its website the duties and obligations of the 
SSB.




 Besides  Shariah Boards, most IIFS, particularly those complying with AAOIFI 
standards, have established another internal Shariah review structure, generally in the 
form of review units.
26  These internal Shariah review units are independent from other 
departments or are an integral part of the Internal Audit and Control Department. The 
array of tasks that they perform is parallel to those of audit departments -- reviewers 
generally use all necessary powers to ascertain that all financial transactions implemented 
                                                 
22 Source: Annual reports, articles of association, and information posted on the websites of the following 
IIFS: Bahrain Islamic Bank, Al Rajhi Banking Corporation, Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad, Jordan Islamic 
bank, Kuwait Finance House, Bank Muamalat Malaysia, Shamil Bank, Bahrain, Islamic Bank of Britain, 
Emirates Islamic Bank, Dubai Islamic Bank, Islamic bank Bangladesh Limited, First Islamic Investment 
Bank and Bank Rakyat Malaysia. Iranian IIFS were not considered. 
Annex II provides an index of Shariah advisory disclosure for the 13 IIFS and compares desirable with 
effective Shariah related disclosure. 
23This means that the SSB report was available on either the website or in the annual report. The proportion 
is 7 out of 11, because the SSBs of two recently established IIFS had not yet issued a report. In Annex III, 
both are counted as disclosed items. 
24 While most of this information is usually available through the Articles of Association, the SSB letter of 
appointment or individual fatwas, these documents are not easily available to customers. This is in stark 
contrast with BCFS that generally have on their website thorough information on their CG practices 
25 Annex III provides an index of Shariah advisory disclosure for the 13 IIFS mentioned in footnote 54. It 
compares desirable with effective Shariah related disclosure. 
26 AAOIFI recommends internal Shariah review in its Governance guidance 3. In Pakistan for example, 
this is dealt with in Annexure-III to IBD Circular No. 02 of 2004  
by management comply with SSB rulings.
27 In some instances Shariah review units have 
exclusive competence on ex-post monitoring.
28 
 
These review units and SSBs face similar challenges, relating, in particular, to 
independence and competence. First, like SSBs and internal auditors, internal Shariah 
reviewers may be subject to a conflict of interest stemming from their employment status, 
with their appointment and remuneration determined by management, and their role as 
assessors of managerial processes and decisions. The scarcity of professionals with 
combined Shariah knowledge and financial skills also affects internal Shariah review 
departments. Like SSB members, internal Shariah reviewers should be knowledgeable in 
Fiqh al-Muamalat. Yet, as already observed, the scarcity of such experts is likely to bear 
on the quality of Shariah reviews in IIFS. The issue may have greater implications in this 
case, because Shariah reviewers would also be assigned to the training of other 
employees on the principles of Fiqh al-Muamalat.
29 Thus, their pronouncements and 
counsel could have pervasive effects throughout their respective IIFS.  
 
B.  Strengthening Internal Arrangements for Shariah Compliance 
 
  The actions of SSBs and Shariah reviewers at the individual institutional level 
have so far been relied upon to provide some degree of comfort in assuring IIFS’s 
compliance with Shariah. However, in line with the foregoing discussions, IIFS, national 
regulators and international standard setters could further address the issues of: (a) 
independence of the SSB, (b) confidentiality of its activities, (c) competence of its 
members, (iv) consistency of pronouncements and (d) disclosure of Shariah decisions 
and audit.  
 
                                                 
27 In this respect, the role of the internal review unit is limited to a complementary ex-post monitoring. This 
makes its task secondary, if more focused and defined, to that of SSB, which is the ultimate arbiter in 
matters of Shariah compliance. 
28 This is the case of large Islamic banks where SSB may not be able to assess large volumes of 
transactions. Therefore, separate Shariah control departments are operational. This seems to be the case in 
Al Rajhi Banking and Investment Corporation and Dubai Islamic Bank. 
29 According to AAOIFII Standard 3. In some cases educational activities are delegated to separate units, as for instance, in the Al 
Rajhi Corporation. (www.alrajhibank.com.sa, April 2005).  
 
  The issue of independence is common to Shariah review bodies. Prevailing 
approaches to the regulation of  internal audit departments and external audit firms can 
provide guidance on how to ensure integrity of pronouncements on Shariah compliance. 
The literature on internal audit independence pinpoints three factors that significantly 
contribute to the degree of auditor independence: (i) clarity of definition of the auditor’s 
responsibilities, (ii) the position of the auditor within the organizational structure of the 
institution, and (iii) the reporting authority for audit results. This would suggest that the 
independence  of both Shariah advisors and reviewers could be enhanced by clearly 
defining their responsibilities and powers in the articles of association of the company or 
in a charter of independence. Their powers would include the authority to access all 
records and staff necessary to conduct the audit and to require management to respond 
formally, and in a timely manner, to significant adverse audit findings by taking 
appropriate corrective action. Such powers should not include operational tasks that could 
impair their independence.
30 Second, the organizational status of internal Shariah bodies 
should be sufficiently articulated to permit the accomplishment of audit responsibilities. 
This appears to be fundamental in the case of Shariah review units that have to deal with 
large volumes of transactions in conducting ex-post assessments. Third, the independence 
of action of SSB and Shariah reviewers and their ability to withstand pressures from 
management can be assured only as long as Shariah bodies functionally report, and are 
accountable, to an individual or entity with sufficient authority to: (a) safeguard their 
independence, (b) achieve a broad audit coverage, (c) ensure adequate consideration of 
audit reports, and (d) generate appropriate action on audit recommendations. This role is 
generally performed by independent directors involved in the audit committee. In the 
case of those IIFS with concentrated shareholding, this role may be assumed by minority 
shareholders’ directors.
31  However, following the practice of external auditors in some 
jurisdictions, Shariah reviewers may be required to report fraud or unexplained breaches 
of rules directly to supervisory authorities. The latter option could be difficult to 
                                                 
30 These may include preparing reports or records, developing procedures, or performing other operational 
duties normally reviewed by auditors. 
31Outside directors in concentrated ownership corporations are generally appointed by the majority 
shareholders themselves and may not be truly independent.  
implement in countries where supervisors may regard matters of Shariah compliance to 
be outside their competence. 
 
  The foregoing would require carrying existing international norms into national 
ones and enforcement monitoring mechanisms. The BCBS and OECD codes contain 
clear provisions on directors’ independence designed to curb collusion opportunities 
between management and other internal bodies. Likewise, AAOIFI’s “governance 
standards on the definition, appointment, composition and report of SSBs” and “Codes of 
Ethics” contain clear provisions on the duties and powers of SSBs that would limit a 
bank’s discretion in the definition of SSB prerogatives and thereby deprive managers of 
one instrument of control.
32 In addition, they contain provisions on fixing remuneration, 
selection and dismissal of SSB members as well as incompatibility clauses to diffuse 
conflicts of interest.
33 A number of national regulators have already included such 
prohibitions in circulars or legislative acts, mostly in the form of fit criteria and 
prohibited interests for the appointment of SSB members or advisors.
34 
 
  Following the practice of periodically rotating external auditing companies, 
mandatory rotation of SSBs would seem to be desirable. Proponents of this measure 
argue that a long-term client relationship can impair the auditor’s objectivity. Therefore, 
by periodically interrupting such a relationship through mandatory rotation, the bank’s 
management would be deprived of its ability to influence the auditors with the threat of 
terminating their mandate. In Italy, the only OECD country that implements mandatory 
                                                 
32 The codes are the Code of Ethics for Accountants and Auditors of Islamic Financial Institutions and the 
Code of Ethics for the Employees of Islamic Financial Institutions. The SSBs’ prerogatives  include ex-ante 
and ex-post evaluation, calculation of Zakat and allocation of profits or charging of losses to unrestricted 
investment account holders. 
33 For instance, dismissal of SSBs may only be prompted by a request of the board of directors approved by 
the general assembly of shareholders. This will prevent “fatwa-shopping”. Further, the standards’ 
provisions prohibit the appointment of “directors or significant stakeholders” as SSB members and the 
prohibition for Shariah review units to carry out operational activities (for instance, a division in the 
internal audit department). Depending on local circumstances, such provisions may be strengthened by 
introducing severe sanctions for accepting loans from the audited company, having family relationship with 
the audit client or having any form of direct or indirect material interest in the business. For instance, in 
Malaysia, the approval and dismissal of SSBs must be communicated to the central bank. 
34 Recent examples include Annexure IV to IDB Circular No. 2 of 2004 of the State Bank of Pakistan on 
“Fit & proper criteria for appointment of Shariah advisors”; Chapter 5 of Islamic Bank of Thailand Act B.E 
2545 on “Advisory Council of the Islamic Bank of Thailand” and Bank Negara Malaysia’s 2004 
“Guidelines on the Governance of Shariah Committee for Islamic Financial Institutions”.  
rotation of external auditors, a recent review of the practice by the “Galgano Committee”, 
instituted following the US CG scandals, recommended that “in order to safeguard an 
auditor’s independence the audit engagement should not be immediately renewed. The 
exclusion of an immediate renewal of the engagement avoids any influence on the 
judgment of the auditors driven by a hope for renewal”.
35  
 
  Opponents of this measure abound. Summer (1998) argues that “by destroying 
rents from an ongoing relation, the rotation rule undermines incentives for building up a 
reputation of honesty”. He therefore suggests that competition in the auditor market may 
be a better safeguard for auditors’ independence. An independent review of the practice 
by the Bocconi University concluded that rotation compromises audit quality, which 
strictly depends on a good knowledge of the business and its management.
36  
 
  Transposing such arguments into a Shariah framework, rotation of SSBs may lead 
to greater independence, but could also produce similar inefficiencies and failures in 
Shariah compliance verification in the transitional phase. Mandatory rotation of SSBs 
may also exacerbate inconsistency in the application of Shariah within the same bank. An 
alternative may be found in the practice of periodically rotating SSB members rather than 
entire boards. This would infuse fresh approaches in the SSB and may increase 
independence through peer review; it would not necessarily compromise the audit 
quality, as the continuing members would assure continuity.   
 
 Preserving  confidentiality of information may require solutions that echo those 
applied to the auditing profession. For instance, Shariah auditors may be required to 
abide by codes of professional conduct. AAOIFI’s Code of Ethics for Accountants and 
                                                 
35 The report grants the possibility of renewal six years after the end of the engagement. Quoted in English 
in FEE (2004).   
36 This report quantified the quality of audit services by the number of suspensions of partners imposed by 
the Consob (the Italian national commission for the 20 audit firms of listed companies). Cases of 
suspension normally arise when auditors do not pinpoint material misstatements. As the report states: “The 
number of partner suspensions in Italy, imposed during the period between 1992 and 2001 amounted to 40. 
The analysis of the distribution of suspensions shows how they are mainly concentrated in the first year of 
an appointment with a total number of 13. The number of suspensions imposed over the following years 
drops dramatically, from one to three a year. For more, FEE (2004). 
  
Auditors for Islamic banks and Financial Institutions provide conduct guidelines tailored 
to Fiqh al-Muamalat professionals. Nevertheless, the applicability of such code in non-
Islamic countries may be constrained by direct references to Islamic morals and Shariah 
law. A viable alternative might be for regulators to extend standard auditing profession 
requirements to Shariah auditors.  
 
 Ensuring  the  competence of SSB members and Shariah reviewers requires a 
multi-pronged approach. Short-term policies to increase the number of qualified Shariah 
advisors would include training activities in Fiqh al-Muamalat at the bank level, in 
specialized training institutes and other government-recognized or related organizations 
such as central banks.
37  Fiqh al-Muamalat degrees could be created and promoted by 
providing grants and certifying universities. Concurrently, the abilities of Shariah 
advisors and reviewers would be certified. The process of certification would begin at the 
IIFS level where managing bodies would appoint SSB members according to established 
criteria on expertise, education and track record that would be spelled out in the articles 
of association. The background of SSB members would also be disclosed in accessible 
information venues, such as websites and annual reports. This process may be 
complemented by self-regulatory professional associations or national authorities who 
would enforce nationwide mandatory criteria.
38  Similarly, a national registration process 
might be established along the lines of the certification of Shariah advisors implemented 
by the Securities Commission of Malaysia. This would have the additional advantage of a 
centralized and therefore standardized assessment of Shariah experts’ skills. Besides 
safeguarding competence, this option may increase independence in Shariah audit. 
 
  Disclosure of the processes leading to Shariah pronouncements and related 
information needs to be the cornerstone of Shariah governance. These issues may not 
have received sufficient attention either from IIFS themselves or their regulators and 
supervisors. Therefore, policies need to be put in place that would ensure adequate 
                                                 
37 Some examples include the Islamic Banking and Finance Institute of Malaysia, the Bahrain Institute of 
Banking and Finance, the Bangladesh Bank Training Academy and Iran’s Training and Human Resource 
Studies Department. 
38 This is the Case of Pakistan’s “Fit & proper criteria for appointment of Shariah advisors” that explicitly 
require “minimum qualification and experience”.  
disclosure, terms of both quality and ease of retrieval, such as through IIFS websites and 
annual reports. Of particular importance would be, inter alia, the  SSB annual report and 
its fatwas. Informing IIFS’s stakeholders on the composition, powers, competence and 
decision-making of SSBs would also enhance the transparency of the processes leading to 
Shariah pronouncements. 
 
III. External  Arrangements for Shariah Compliance 
 
 
  Under the prevailing current decentralized system of Shariah advisory, the 
flexibility in Fiqh opinions has encouraged innovation in Islamic financial products, 
contributing significantly to the dynamism of the industry. Nevertheless, because of the 
very nature of jurisprudence, interpretation of the Shariah by a large number of 
independent scholars, notably in the various SSBs gives rise to inconsistencies in the 
fatwas across SSBs, or even over time in the same SSB. Internal systems and procedures 
could be developed in IIFS to limit inconsistencies and explain different pronouncements. 
External arrangements, including mechanisms of market discipline can provide 
complementary channels inducing compliance with rulings and their harmonization. The 
following first analyzes existing external arrangements and then considers options to 
strengthen them.      
 
 
A.  Existing External Arrangements 
 
 The  broad  Shariah governance framework may feature (a) arrangements put in 
place by regulators, and (b) the presence of providers of financial information services 
external to the firms. Among regulatory arrangements, centralized SSBs are the most 
noteworthy.   While there are significant differences across countries, centralized SSBs 
are usually concerned with ex-ante monitoring, mostly understood as standardization of 
Shariah interpretation, and ex-post monitoring of Shariah compliance. They also offer 
arbitration to settle Shariah disputes arising between members of the same SSB. In 
addition, a few countries have set up public rating agencies that assess financial 
instruments and institutions. These are meant to create a positive climate for Shariah  
compliant investments. Table II offers an overview of such regulatory institutions in key 
jurisdictions where Islamic finance services are offered. 
 
Table II - External Shariah CG institutions by country* 
Country  Centralized SSB or High Shariah 
Authority or Fatwa Board 
Islamic Rating Agency  
Jordan   No No 
Malaysia   3  3 
Sudan  3  No 
Bahrain   No † No  † 
Kuwait  3  No 
Pakistan  3  No 
UAE  3  No 
Indonesia   3  No 
* See Annex III for the names and powers of these departments/authorities. 
† Bahrain is the seat of the IIFM and the IIRA that respectively set standards for Islamic jurisprudence and rate Islamic instruments on 
an international scale. 
Source: Official Government websites and Central Banks’ Annual Reports.  
 
  One of the distinctive goals of these bodies is the standardization of Shariah 
practices within their jurisdictions. Countries such as Kuwait, Malaysia or Pakistan have 
taken significant actions in this respect, while others have not followed this route. The 
standardization of Islamic instruments may be a major determinant in ensuring the 
enforceability of Islamic financial contracts in disputes brought before civil courts that 
are not legally bound by the Shariah. Accordingly, standardization of practices would 
support property rights of involved stakeholders as well as sustain the development of 
IIFS in non-Islamic countries. However, the practice of centralized SSBs creates the 
possibility that one IIFS group operating in different jurisdictions may have products 
deemed Shariah compliant in one place and not in another. In addition, regulators in non- 
Islamic jurisdictions would consider that matters relating to the Shariah are not in their 
purview (e.g., the UK FSA).
39  
 
  Private mechanisms for the external governance of Shariah compliance are 
equally limited. In particular, private rating agencies have not yet developed the 
necessary skills or found enough incentives to monitor the IIFS’ Shariah compliance. 
“Islamic rating” has so far been the exclusive domain of government-sponsored 
organizations such as the IIRA and the Malaysian Rating Corporation.  Likewise, other 
external entities with an interest in Islamic finance, such as the financial media and 
external auditors, are still generally less concerned with assessments of Shariah 
compliance.  
 
  A notable exception is the multiplication of stock market Islamic indices whose 
major contribution is the identification of halal  investments.
40 Islamic stock market 
indices, like the FTSE Global Islamic Index, the Dow Jones Islamic Indexes and the 
Indonesian  Shariah Index, may contribute to better Shariah governance for publicly 
traded IIFS. By filtering out companies with activities that are incompatible with Shariah, 
as well as firms with unacceptable levels of debt or interest income, they contribute to 
reducing adverse selection in investments by IIFS, and give additional comfort  on the 
halal nature of IIFS activities.
41  However, current practice is not likely to meet with a 
full consensus of Shariah scholars. Usually, these indices include companies that deal in 
interest because of the lack of a fully interest-free international market. While some 
Islamic finance scholars may find this approach acceptable, others will not, thus limiting 
the role of these indices in enhancing Shariah governance.  
 
                                                 
39 In Malaysia, for instance, the judicial system has agreed to resort to the Central Bank’s Shariah Council 
for opinions on the permissibility of Islamic financial instruments, whenever a court case brought before it 
may require it. It would be hard to replicate such a scheme in other countries, where regulators may not 
want to get involved in Shariah issues.     
40 Halal conveys goodness and by extension has taken the meaning of “permissible”. 
41 In the case of Dow Jones Islamic Indexes, excluded businesses include: alcohol, conventional financial 
services (banking, insurance, etc.), entertainment (casinos/gambling, cinema, pornography, hotels, etc.), 
tobacco manufacturers, pork-related products and defense and weapons companies. Companies classified in 
other industry groups may also be excluded if they are deemed to have material ownership of or revenues 
from the businesses mentioned above.  
B.  Strengthening External Arrangements for Shariah Compliance 
 
  Recent literature and practice have focused on establishing external CG structures 
to ensure effective Shariah audit. In proposing the externalization of Shariah advisory, 
Chapra and Habib (2002) suggest that chartered audit firms should acquire the necessary 
knowledge to undertake Shariah audit. This process is already underway as evidenced by 
the increasing number of independent consulting companies and law firms offering 
Shariah advisory services.
42  In addition to reducing internal audit costs in the Islamic 
financial institution, the use of such services would possibly give the institution access to 
a broader range of expertise.  In addition, the public may perceive chartered Shariah audit 
companies as more independent from the institution’s management.  It is not certain, 
however, that switching to external Shariah audit would bring tangible guarantees of 
Shariah compliance. Potential for “Shariah advisory à la carte” would not end with the 
externalization of services. In addition, externalization will not improve, and may in fact 
worsen, the accuracy of Shariah audit. Internal auditors are generally familiar with the 
records systems, policies and procedures of the institution and can provide quick 
responses to managers. The result could be a more detailed and exhaustive internal audit. 
 
.  The idea of external firms undertaking Shariah audit presents some advantages if 
it is viewed as complementing internal Shariah audit. Shariah audit firms would perform 
a role similar to that of their counterparts in conventional finance, thus introducing an 
additional layer in the Shariah verification process. Such a system would obviously entail 
a clear separation of pre-audit and post-audit functions. Complementary internal and 
external audit would apply only to post-audit, while the internal pre-audit unit, the SSB, 
would have the sole authority to issue fatwas. Internal audit by the SSB would have an 
independent appraisal function, including the review of Shariah verification systems and 
controls, while external Shariah auditors would have a statutory responsibility to express 
an independent opinion on Shariah compliance. To avoid duplication, the latter function 
could be performed by Shariah departments set up by existing chartered auditors. (Table 
                                                 
42 For example: http://www.yasaar.org/rationale.htm, & http://www.islamic-banking.com/shariah/index. 
php  
  
III shows how internal and external Shariah review may be differentiated and illustrates 
the merit of specialization.  
 
Table III – Comparison of Internal and External Shariah Review 
  Internal Shariah Review Unit   External Shariah auditing firm 
Focus 
  
Provides exhaustive internal review, and train 
employees on Shariah related matters. It 
responds to managerial concerns over 
upholding Shariah conformance of all 
transactions 
Primarily provides an independent 
certification as to the reasonableness of 
financial information provided to 
shareholders and stakeholders. It responds 
to regulators’ and stakeholders’ desire for 
an independent appraisal of Shariah 
compliance  
Activities   Assess compliance of all transactions with the 
fatwas issued by the SSB. To this effect, it 
creates systems of control and assessment. 
Assess the information provided by the 
managers and present statements according 
to relevant Shariah accounting standards. 
It uses samples of transactions to evaluate 
truthfulness of compliance and expresses 
an opinion on financial statements 
Manage-
ment 
Reports to management administratively. 
Builds relationships throughout the 
organization to ensure concerns are identified 
and resolved in a timely manner. 
Primarily reports to the audit committee 





Reports directly to the audit committee. 
Provides opinions on the organization’s 
business risks, financial statements, system of 
internal control, and level of compliance with 
laws, regulations, and policies.        
Attests to the audit committee the accuracy 
of the financial reports and attests on 
management’s assessment on internal 
controls over financial reporting. Provides 
updates on pending accounting 
pronouncements and their potential impact 
on the organization. 
Independ-
ence 
Should demonstrate organizational 
independence and objectivity in work 
approach, but is not independent of the 
organization. (Is independent of the activity 
audited, but is integral to the organization.) 
It is organizationally and managerially 
independent of the organization. 
Results  Identifies problems, make recommendations, 
and helps facilitate resolutions. 
Meets statutory requirements and provides 
necessary adjustments to meet financial 
accuracy. 
Risk  Identifies and qualifies key business risks to 
estimate probability of occurrence and impact 
on business. Makes appropriate 
recommendations as a result of the risk 
assessment. 
Identifies key transactions and exposures 
for financial statements. 
  
Fraud  Includes fraud detection steps in audit 
programs. Investigates the allegations of fraud. 
Reviews fraud prevention controls and 
detection processes put in place by 
management and makes recommendations for 
improvement. 
Includes fraud detection steps in audit 
plan. Gathers information necessary to 
identify risks of material misstatement due 
to fraud, by inquiring of management and 
others within the entity about the risks of 
fraud. Considers the results of the 
analytical procedures performed in 
planning the audit and fraud risk factors. 
Recomm-
endations 
Communicates to management in the audit 
reports recommendations for corrective action. 
Communicates recommendations for 
corrective action. 
*Adapted from table in Richards (2002). 
 
  A framework of co-existing internal and external Shariah audits as described 
above does not help to resolve the difficulties caused by inconsistencies in the body of 
fatwas. In an effort to alleviate this problem, some jurisdictions have moved towards a 
system of centralized SSBs. The latter carry the expectation of harmonization of 
permissible financial instruments through adjudicating disputes between Shariah advisors 
and by standardizing existing practices. However, the ongoing globalization of Islamic 
finance as well as constraints on its applicability in secular countries limits the feasibility 
of this approach.    To circumvent these limitations, Khan and Feddad (2004) recommend 
the gradual international codification and standardization of fatwas.
 This duty may be 
delegated to an existing international organization, whose mission already involves the 
promotion of harmonization and convergence of Shariah interpretations.
43  Alternatively, 
a new self-regulating non-profit association of Fiqh al-Muamalat experts may be created. 
However, despite its apparent advantages, the creation of a global Shariah regulator is 
likely to meet with resistance, specifically from jurists who regard Islamic Fiqh as a 
pluralist body of knowledge.  Also, the centralization of competences in a global 
regulator may undermine product innovation and financial engineering.
44  
                                                 
43 AAOIFI’s mission statements declare that  “the powers of (AAOIFI’s) Shari'a Board include, among 
others, the following: achieving harmonization and convergence in the concepts and application among the 
Shari'a supervisory boards of Islamic financial institutions to avoid contradiction or inconsistency between 
the fatwas and applications by these institutions, thereby providing a pro-active role for the Shari'a 
supervisory boards of Islamic financial institutions and central banks (…)” Likewise IIFM’s “role includes 
the promotion of harmonization and convergence of Shariah interpretations in developing Islamic banking 
products and practices that are universally acceptable”.  Sources: www.aaoifi.com and www.iifm.net/ 
44 This would obviously depend on the degree of powers transferred to such an organization. For instance, 
the State Bank of Pakistan has issued “Essentials of Islamic modes of financing” to ensure compliance with 
minimum Shariah standards, which do not present an obstacle to innovation and yet contribute to 
harmonizing permissible contracts. For more www.sbp.org.pk.  
 
  Over-reliance on the public sector for regulating Shariah matters may also present 
other difficulties, such as the reluctance of authorities in a large number of jurisdictions, 
to be involved in what they would consider private religious matters. In such situations, 
the private sector could fill the gap and play a more decisive role in the Shariah 
compliance process. The focus would be on consolidating the Shariah related information 
infrastructure by creating new processes or strengthening the exiting infrastructure. Next 
to external Shariah audit firms, representational agents that normally channel financial 
information to the public may acquire new skills and assess IIFS’s compliance with 
Islamic finance rules.  
 
  In the future, key players in this field may be the private rating agencies. One may 
anticipate that they would gradually develop skills to evaluate Shariah compliance and 
make this information readily available to investors using their existing dissemination 
infrastructure. Their coverage may also include companies in which IIFS have a stake. 
This would create a positive climate for Shariah compliant investments, particularly for 
partnership and venture capital transactions. It is noteworthy that some leading rating 
companies have included “religious supervision” as an item in their reports on IIFS.
45 
However, this is often limited to a summary statement on the existence of a SSB and the 
conclusions of the SSB annual reports. Eventually, one may envisage a more articulate 
contribution through the adoption of Shariah compliance indicators that would quantify 
Shariah disclosure, profit-sharing and Zakat.
46 In addition, Islamic market indices may 
prove important. One may expect that current criticisms about their use will diminish 
with the development of the industry. With the progressive increase of halal products, 




                                                 
45 This is notably the case of Capital Intelligence bank reports.  
46 Shahul et al. (2004) propose the creation of two (disclosure and performance) “Islamicity Indices”. They 
quantify, among other things, Shariah compliance, corporate governance practices, social and 
environmental impact, profit-sharing performance and zakat performance.  
Section IV. Conclusion 
 
  Overall, current practice to ensure Shariah compliance relies essentially on 
internal corporate structures, in particular SSBs. These certainly offer stakeholders a level 
of comfort. Nevertheless, they face a number of challenges relating to their 
independence, the confidentiality of institution-specific proprietary information, the 
limited availability of professionals with both Shariah scholarship and financial skills, 
and the need for consistency in pronouncements between the various SSBs. A few 
jurisdictions have tried to address some of these issues by introducing an external 
institutional infrastructure. This, however, creates potential difficulties arising out of 
inconsistent pronouncements for IIFS groups operating in different jurisdictions, and may 
be problematic for regulators in non-Islamic countries. Market solutions to offer services 
that would promote Shariah compliance are still minimal.  
 















Figure 1 summarizes structures and processes internal and external to an IIFS that 
can jointly provide an effective framework to monitor and assess Shariah compliance. 
Such a framework can be instrumental in enhancing stakeholders’ confidence. It would 
enable innovation that can generally be expected to emerge mainly within the firm, where 
a sufficiently competent and independent SSB would be empowered to approve new 
Shariah conforming instruments. In issuing its fatwas, the SSB can be guided by 
standardized contracts and practices consistent with principles emerging from external 
arrangements, notably from international standard-setting official or self-regulatory 
bodies. The review of transactions would mainly be entrusted to internal review units, 
which would collaborate with external auditors, responsible for issuing an annual opinion 
on whether the IIFS activities meet its Shariah requirements. This process would be 
sustained by reputable agents, like rating agencies, stock markets, financial media, and 
researchers who would channel signals to market players. Such a framework including 
structures and processes internal and external to the IIFS can be expected to enhance 
public understanding of the requirements of Shariah.  It would be conducive to the 
development of market discipline as it would permit an effective utilization of exit and 
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Annex I: Glossary of Arabic Terms 
Amana 
(Demand deposits) 
Deposits held at the bank for safekeeping purpose. They are guaranteed in capital value 
and earn no return.  
Fatwa  Legal opinion issued by a qualified scholar on matters of religious belief and practice.  
Fiqh 
(Islamic jurisprudence) 
It refers to Islamic jurisprudence that covers all aspects of life: religious, political, social 
and economic. Fiqh is mainly based on interpretations of the Qur’an and Sunna (sayings 
and deeds of the prophet).  
Fiqh al-Muamalat  Islamic Commercial Jurisprudence. 
Gharar  Literally, : uncertainty, hazard, chance or risk. Technically, sale of a thing which is not 
present at hand; or the sale of a thing whose consequence or outcome is not known; or a 
sale involving risk or hazard in which one does not know whether it will come to be or 
not, such as fish in water or a bird in the air. 
Halal  That which is permissible according to Shariah Law. 
Haram   Unlawful according to the Shariah. It indicates transactions which are not permissible 
under Islamic law. 
Hibah  Literally gift. A gift awarded voluntarily in return for a loan. 
Ju’ala 
(Service charge) 
A party pays another a specified amount of money as a fee for rendering a specific 
service in accordance to the terms of the contract stipulated between the two parties. This 
mode usually applies to transactions such as consultations and professional services, 
fund placements and trust services. 
Kifala  It is a pledge given to a creditor that the debtor will pay the debt, fine, or liability. A third 
party becomes surety for the payment of the debt if unpaid by the person originally 
liable. 
Mudaraba 
(Trustee finance contract) 
Rabb -al- mal (capital’s owner) provides the entire capital needed to finance a project 
while the entrepreneur offers his labor and expertise. Profits are shared between them at 
a certain fixed ratio, whereas financial losses are exclusively borne by rabb-al-mal. The 
liability of the entrepreneur is limited only to his time and effort. 
Murabaha 
(Mark–up financing) 
The seller informs the buyer of his cost of acquiring or producing a specified product. 





The bank enters into an equity partnership agreement with one or more partners to jointly 
finance an investment project. Profits (and losses) are shared strictly in relation to the 
respective capital contributions. 
Qard Hassan 
(Beneficence loans) 
These are zero-return loans that the Qur’an encourages Muslims to make to the needy. 
Banks are allowed to charge borrowers a service fee to cover the administrative expenses 
of handling the loan. The fee should not be related to the loan amount or maturity. 
Quran  Islamic scriptures believed by Muslims to be God's revelation to the Prophet.  
Riba’  Literally, an excess or increase. Technically, an increase, which in a loan transaction or 
in exchange of a commodity, accrues to the owner (lender) without giving an equivalent 
counter value or recompense in return to the other party.  
Shariah 
(Islamic Law) 
The Islamic Law extracted from the Qur’an and Sunna (sayings and deeds of the 
Prophet). 
Sunna  Deeds of the Prophet. 
Takaful  Arabic name for insurance based on Shariah rules. An Islamic Insurance is a collective 
protection scheme. It literally means solidarity. Takaful reflects solidarity and is akin to 
mutual insurance. 
Umma  Community of the faithful within Islam 
Wadiah  A safe custody contract between the depositor (customer) and the custodian (bank). 
Wikala  An Agency contract which may include in its terms a fee for the agent. Same contract 
can also be used to give a power of attorney to someone to represent another’s interests. 
Zakat  Religious tax to be deducted from wealth to be paid to the needy.  




Annex II: Mission statements of IIFS and ICFS 
IIFS  Mission statements, 
objectives or vision 
ICFS  Mission statements, 





(The bank’s goals are) 
commitment to providing 
banking services based on 
compliance with the rules     and 
principles of the glorious Islamic 
Shariah in all our activities to 
serve our community as a whole, 
and commitment to equally serve 
the interests of all related parties 
including shareholders, 





(Our) (…) basic principles of 
the consolidation are: 1) offer a 
wide range of the highest quality 
financial services to our 
customers 2) maximize 
shareholders’ value and, as the 
leader of Japan’s financial 
services industry, earn the trust 
of society at large, 3) offer 
attractive and rewarding job 





The Corporate Mission of the 
Bank is to seek to operate as a 
commercial bank functioning on 
the basis of Islamic principles, 
providing banking facilities and 
services to Muslims and the 
whole population of this country, 
with viability and capability to 
sustain itself and grow in the 
process 
 
(The Bank’s) Corporate 
Objective is to provide its 
customers with Islamic Banking 
facilities and services of the 
highest possible quality;  to attain 
viability and sufficient level of 
profitability to sustain growth; to 
develop and foster a competent 
and innovative management 
imbibed with high standards of 
integrity and Islamic banking 
professionalism;  to develop a 
motivated workforce inculcated 
with appropriate work ethics 
fully committed to the Bank and 
to offer efficient and courteous 
service to customers; to 
constantly strive to protect its 
shareholders’ interest; to be 
always conscious of its 
responsibilities and duties as an 
Islamic corporate citizen. 
Norges Bank, 
Norway 
The company's primary 
objective must be to maximize 
shareholders' long-term returns. 
There must be a clearly defined 
business strategy that is 
anchored in the board of 
directors. The company must 
present accurate, adequate and 
timely information concerning 
its financial position and other 
relevant information. 
 
The company's board of 
directors shall protect the 
interests of all shareholders and 
shall be accountable for the 
decisions made by the board. 
The board of directors shall 
supervise the day-to-day 
management and company 
activities, and shall ensure a 
proper organization of these 
activities, including adequate 





In accordance with the Islamic 
principles, KFH ensures that 
while working with the public 
professionally, the company 
guarantees an honorable 
relationship with its client base 





Our basic corporate objective 
(is) maximizing the value of our 





The ultimate goal being to 
eventually institute an elaborate 
and comprehensive banking 
system based on the rules of 
Islamic Shari'ah which meets the 




Mission:  We compete to be 
the leading global provider of 
financial solutions for 
demanding clients creating 
exceptional value for our 







To build the bank into a modern, 
dynamic and strong Islamic Bank 
that would play a role in 
providing a viable alternative to 
the conventional system, that will 
contribute to the development of 





The key financial objective of 
the Bank is to have Total 
Shareholder Return in the top 
quartile of our Australian listed 






To contribute to the globalization 
of Islamic Banking as the 
principal institution within the 
Russian Federation implementing 
Islamic financial and economic 
concepts, which offer a unique 
solution for social justice and 




The seven corporate principles 
are as follows: Focus on the 
customer as the centre of 
business; creation of shareholder 
value through business activity; 
teamwork as the engine in the 
creation of value; a management 
style that generates enthusiasm; 
ethical behavior and personal 
integrity as a way of 
understanding and conducting 
business; innovation as the 
engine of progress; and 
corporate social responsibility as 







We strive to be a premier 
regional Islamic bank, dedicated 
to the economic and social 
development of our target 
markets, maximizing our clients 
and shareholders value, and 
focusing on the human resource 
development in an environment 
of creativity and innovation. 
Albaraka is committed to 
develop and promote an 
integrated Islamic Financial 
System. Compliance with the 
rules and principles of Islamic 
Sharia is the core of the banking 
and financial activities of the 
Bank. To this end, the Bank has 
successfully sought the advice 
and expertise of Islamic scholars 
acclaimed for their knowledge 
and piety from all over the 
Islamic world to guide is path 




BNP Paribas founds its 
corporate project on three 
commitments: 1) toward its 
customers, BNP Paribas 
undertakes to give first priority 
to their satisfaction and to 
constantly improving the quality 
of their welcome and of the 
services offered, 2) toward its 
shareholders, BNP Paribas 
undertakes to put value creation 
at the very heart of its options, 
3) toward its employees, BNP 
Paribas undertakes to ensure a 
dynamic and stimulating 
management of careers and 
remuneration by developing 
employee share-ownership and 
promoting social dialogue.  
The respect of these 
commitments is guaranteed by 
the team spirit of all the bank's 
employees and their adherence 







(The) Objectives of the 
Bank (are): 1) Providing 
banking services of the highest 
standards according to Islamic 
Jyske Bank 
A/S, Denmark 
(…) The Jyske Bank Group is 
managed and operated as a 
business. At the same time, we 
attach great importance to   29
Shariah without dealing in riba 
(interest on money) and by using 
the-state-of-the-art technology in 
computer, telecommunication 
and information system 2) 
Investing funds prudently to 
achieve optimum and not 
maximum profits, for the mutual 
benefit of customers and the 
bank. 3) Coordination, 
cooperation and integration with 
other financial bodies that apply 
Islamic Shariah in their dealings, 
in order to support creating a 
base and regulations for an 
Islamic financial system. 3) 
Development of the Islamic 
society in all fields of the 
economy by investing in 
industries, agriculture, 
commerce, and real estate in 
order provide job opportunities. 
4) Promotion of social 
benevolence through its Islamic 
methods, particularly through 
Zakat. 5) Contributing to the 
welfare of society in line with the 
five main tenets of Islam, namely 
protection of life, purity of mind, 
property, honour and social 
justice. 6) Promoting the savings 
habit and encouraging people to 
invest wisely within the 
parameters of Islamic Shariah 
through investment and finance 
instruments to suit individual 
requirements. 7) Making 
available the necessary capital 
for entrepreneurs for the 
establishment of economic 
projects and creation of 
alternative instruments for 
finance according to Islamic 
Shariah. 
treating the three groups of 
stakeholders – shareholders, 
customers and employees – with 
equal respect. (…) 
 
Our objective is to provide our 
shareholders with a satisfactory 
long-term return on their 
investment. Thus, the aim is for 
Jyske Bank every year to be one 
of the top-performing Danish 
banks based on the level of our 
earnings. Jyske Bank is thus an 
excellent choice for 
shareholders who want to make 
a long-term investment and who 
do not attach great importance 
to decisions which generate only 





(The bank’s goals are): to 
maintain the role of a bank that is 
not tied up with interest; to 
strengthen the business; to carry 
out social and organizational 
stability; to provide an excellent 
service; and to well direct and 




Mission: To become the most 
admired Malaysian financial 
services company by providing 
excellent customer services, 
enhancing shareholder value, 
providing challenging career 
and learning opportunities for 
employees, demonstrating 




(E.C.)   
Our mission is to uphold our 
carefully formulated Islamic 
principles in the quest for mutual 
prosperity for our clients and the 
Bank.  In pursuit of our mission, 
we commit the Bank to the purest 
forms of Islamic banking 
products and services from a 
HSBC Canada, 
Canada 
HSBC in Canada is committed 
to being Canada’s leading 
international financial services 
organization, a leader in chosen 
markets, and recognized by its 
clients as proactive, responsive, 
competitive and secure. To 
achieve a superior long term   30
Shari’a perspective.  We remain 
demonstrably  independent from 
the conventional sector and 
recognize the importance of 
Islam’s social objectives in 
conducting business. We are 
committed to delivering a level of 
service that matches, or exceeds, 
the market practice 
internationally.  To do so, we 
seek to employ the best available 
human resources and the 
technology to apply the highest 
professional, moral and ethical 
standards.  
return for our shareholder we 
will efficiently deliver a 
differentiated client experience 
which reflects our commitment 
to excellence in sales, service 
and products, and which is 
delivered by highly motivated 
and well qualified employees, 
working as a team. Through 
managing for value, HSBC in 
Canada is committed to making 
a world of difference to its 






Establish Islamic banking as 
banking of first choice to 
facilitate the implementation of 
an equitable economic system, 
providing a strong foundation for 
establishing a fair and just 
society for mankind. To be a 
premier Islamic bank, offering a 
one-stop shop for innovative 
value added products and 
services to our customers within 
the bounds of Shariah, while 
optimizing  the stakeholders' 
value through an organizational 
culture based on learning, 





Barclays aims to be one of the 
most admired financial services 
organizations in the world; in 
the eyes of our shareholders, our 
customers, our colleagues and 
the communities in which we 
work.  
 
The best measure of our long 
term performance is the total 
return we give to our 
shareholders - the increase in the 
price of our shares, assuming 
that any dividends are used to 
buy more shares, known as 
'Total Shareholder Return'. 
Source: Extracts of corporate mission and goals obtained from websites or annual reports. 31 
Annex III: Legal Basis and Nature of Regulations on Internal SSBs in Selected Countries 
 
Country  Legal base for 
SSB 
SSB competences as 









Fit and proper criteria for 
SSB members 
Bahrain   BMA Rulebook -
Volume 2- Islamic 
Banks - The BMA 
(2005) and all 
AAOIFI standards 
General duty to verify Shariah 
compliance and issue an annual 
report.  Binding advice The 
shareholders shall decide how 
SSB will discharge this duty. 








Shareholders. Dismissal is 
proposed by Board and 
approved by shareholders 
(according to AAOIFI 
standards) 
Conflict of interest and competence 
clauses (According to AAOIFI 
governance standards). 
DIFC∗   Law regulating 
Islamic financial 
business, DIFC Law 
No. 13 of 2004 and 
the Islamic Financial 
Business Module of 
the DFSA Rulebook  
Oversees and advises on 
Shariah compliance. Specific 
duties to be established and 
documented by the BIFS.  
No less than three 
members. 
Unspecified. Appointed  and  dismissed 
by the bank’s governing 
body 
They must be competent (based on 
previous experience and qualifications) 
and are not directors or controllers of 
the BIFS 
Indonesia   Act No. 7 of 1992 as 
amended by Act 10 of 
1998, Regulation 
4/1/PBI/2002. 
General obligation to verify 
Shariah compliance (duties as 
stipulated by National Shariah 
Board and established by in 
bank’s articles of association). 
Unspecified. Unspecified.  Any  appointment  or 
replacement of SSB 
members must be reported 
to Bank Indonesia and 
approved by the National 
Shariah Board. 
Documentary evidence on SSB 
members’ previous experience to be 
submitted to Bank Indonesia’s Board 
of Governors. 
Jordan   Art. 58 of Law 28 of 
2000 as amended by 
temporary Law 
No.46 of 2003. 
Ex ante audit (fatwas), ex-post 
audit, opinions on Shariah 
matters referred to it. 
No less than three 
members. 
By unanimous or 
majority vote. Its 
votes are valid only if 
a majority of 
members is present. 
Appointed by the general 
assembly of shareholders. 
Discharged only through a 
reasoned decision taken 
by 2/3 of the board of 
directors and endorsed by 
the general assembly. 
Changes have to be 
notified to the Central 
Bank. 
Unspecified. 
Kuwait  Art 93 of Law No. 32 
of 1968. 
General obligation to verify 
Shariah compliance of banking 
operations. 
No less than three 
members. 
By unanimity. In case 
of conflict the matter 
is referred to the 
Fatwa Board. 
Unspecified Unspecified 
Lebanon  Law No. 575 on  Certification of Shariah Three  members.  Unspecified.  Appointment for a  Unspecified (experts’ background   32
"Establishing Islamic 
Banks in Lebanon". 
compliance and proposals for 
properly achieving bank’s 
objectives pursuant to the 
Shariah.   
renewable three- year 
period.  
must be in Islamic law, doctrine and 
banking and financial operations). 
Malaysia   Islamic Banking Act 
of 1983 and Central 
Bank of Malaysia Act 
1958 (Revised 1994) 
and Guidelines on 
the Governance of 
Shariah Committees 
(2004) 
Binding advice Shariah on 
compliance of banking 
operations for Islamic Banks. 
The Central Shariah Advisory 
Council is the ultimate arbiter. 
Unspecified.  Unspecified.  Unspecified.  There are several incompatibility 
clauses. 
Pakistan  IBD Circular No. 02 
of 2004. 
General obligation to verify 
Shariah compliance of banking 
operations. The SSB must 
submit an annual report to 
shareholders. 
Only one advisor 
required. A board 
may be set up at 
the bank’s 
discretion.  
Unspecified.  Appointment must be 
approved by State Bank of 
Pakistan. 
They are compulsory and relate to 
minimum qualification and experience, 
track record, solvency, financial 
integrity, honesty and reputation and 
conflicts of interests. 
Philippines  Republic Act No. 





Republic Act No. 
6848 
It offers advice and undertakes 
reviews on matters relating to 
Shariah compliance. 
At least three but 
no more than five 
members. 
Unspecified.  Unspecified.  SSB members must be Islamic 
scholars and jurists of comparative 
law. 
Thailand  Islamic Bank of 
Thailand Act B.E 
2545. 
It has “the authority and duty to 
give advice and 
recommendations to the Board 
of Directors concerning Islamic 
principles related to the 
operation of the bank”. 
Not more than 4 
members  
At least half of the 
SSB members form a 
quorum and decisions 
are taken by majority 
vote. 
SSB members have a two-
year tenure and may be 
reappointed. They are 
appointed and removed by 
the board of directors. 
Financial integrity, competence, 
honesty and conflicts of interests. 
UAE  Federal Law No. 6 of 
1985 
General obligation to verify 
Shariah compliance of banking 
operations. Detailed 
competences to be established 
by the bank. 
No less than three  To be decided in the 
articles of association 
of the bank 
SSB members must be 
approved by the Higher 
Shariah Authority 
Unspecified 
∗ Dubai International Financial Centre  
Source: Official country websites and central bank Annual Reports 
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Annex IV: External Shariah CG institutions by country  
Source: Official country websites and central bank Annual Reports 
Country  Separate Islamic 
Banking & Takaful 
Department  at CB 
Centralized SSB or High Shariah Authority 
or Fatwa Board 
Islamic Rating 
Agency 
Separate Islamic Capital 
Market Department within 
Securities regulator 
Bahrain   Yes, Islamic Financial 
Institutions Supervision 
Directorate 
No, but the International Islamic Financial Market is to promote 
the harmonization and convergence of Shariah interpretations in 
developing Islamic banking products and practices which are 
universally acceptable 
No, but International 
Islamic Rating 
Agency operates in 
Bahrain 
No 
Indonesia   Yes, the Directorate of 
Shariah Banking 
Yes, the National Shariah Board is authorized to issue fatwas 
concerning products, services and operations of BIFS. It also 
recommends Shariah advisors to BIFS 
No  
Jordan   No No  No  No 
Kuwait  No The  Fatwa Board in the Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs 
is the final authority on Shariah disputes. Its advice is binding 
when it arbitrates on disputes between members of the same 
SSB 
No No 
Malaysia   Yes, Regulation Department 
–Islamic Banking and 
Takaful 
Yes. The Shariah Council advises central bank on Shariah 
matters and is the ultimate arbiter in Shariah interpretation 
disputes. The directives issued by BNM in consultation with the 
Shariah Council have binding authority over Banks with 





Yes, Malaysian SEC- Islamic Capital 
Market Department. The SEC also has 
its own Shariah Advisory Board 
Sudan  N/A, the whole financial 
regulatory system is Islamic 
Yes, the Shariah High Supervisory Board is responsible for 
fatwas, contract specimen, arbitrage, consultations relating to 
Islamic legal aspects, training, research, lectures, and seminars  
No  N/A, the whole financial regulatory 
system is Islamic 
Pakistan  Yes, Islamic Banking 
Department 
Yes, the Shariah Board of the State Bank is to advise the 
central banks on matters of Shariah. It also produces specimen 
of permissible Islamic Financial contract to ensure compliance 
with minimum Shariah standards  
No  No, but several  departments share 
Islamic finance portfolio 
UAE  No Yes,  the  Higher Shariah Authority, attached to the Ministry of 
Justice and Islamic Affairs, is the final arbiter on Shariah 
matters. It is also responsible of Shariah supervision 
No No 
Source: Official country websites and central bank Annual Reports   34
 
 


















A  1 1 1  0  0 0 
B  1 0 1  0  0 0 
C  1 0 1  0  0 0 
D  1 0 1  1  0 0 
E  1 0 0  0  0 0 
F  1 0 0  0  1 0 
G  1 0 1  0  0 0 
H  1 1 1  1  0 0 
I  1 1 0  0  0 1 
L  1 1 1  0  0 0 
M  1 1 1  0  0 0 
N  1 1 1  0  0 0 
O  1 0 0  0  0 0 
Effective 
Disclosure   1.00 0.46 0.69  0.15  0.08 0.08 
Desirable 
disclosure   1.00 1.00 1.00  1.00  1.00 1.00 
*The 6 indexes are calculated by attributing a 1 to every item that is disclosed and a 0 to items that 
are not disclosed by the 13 IIFS specified in footnote 54, in information venues such as annual 
reports and websites. The average across IIFS for every item is then taken to calculate the effective 
disclosure index. The desirable disclosure index is 1 assuming that ideally every IIFS in the sample 
ought to disclose information on Shariah Governance processes and structures.  
** Two IIFS had never issued a SSB report due to their recent establishment. Nevertheless, the 
items are counted as disclosed due to the IIFS overall high level of disclosure 
SSB composition 
Background of SSB 
 SSB Annual Report*
Fatwas
Decision-making 
















1.00 0.46 0.69 0.15 0.08 0.08
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